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Hala!! vuestros deseos son ordenes para mi....ya tenéis para leer el que se aburra.... no me conecto mucho porque me ha tocado preparar las evaluaciones de los CRCs este año y tengo muuuucha documentación que preparar.

 

 

NATO RAPID DEPLOYABLE CORPS
THESSALONIKI, GREECE
OPPLAN 50011 HOT OVEN

 

1. SITUATION
a. Political Environment
SUMER (SUM) is a country characterized by a fragile political system. After a long communist political trajectory under the influence of AKAD (AKD), and under a totalitarian regime, in 1982 the first free elections took place since the fall of the world communist bloc. The liberal government emerged fron these elections initiated the opening of the country towards the West and the approach to the European Union (EU) and NATO. However, conservative hereditary parties of the old regime, have tried during the more than thirty years of democracy, to destabilize the liberal Government to return to the communist orbit.
The arrival of a democratic regime in Sumer promoted the rapprochement between Spain and the neighboring country, which materialized in numerous agreements of economic cooperation between both States. One of the most ambitious agreements between the two countries in military matters was the sale, by Spain, of F18A and C-130 Hercules aircraft.
Similarly, in 1999, Sumer became a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) project and, in 2009, it was formally included in the Individual Action Plans of the Association, in recognition of the political will of Sumer to have a greater relationship with NATO, previous step to the Plan of Action for the Adhesion to the Organization.
This change of course in terms of foreign policy by SUMER opens the door for other countries of the Alliance to sign contracts in military material. Thus, the US supplies SUMER with F16C and France sells an AWACS E3F aircraft.
Although the country has evolved in terms of civil liberties, corruption continues to be anchored at the deepest levels of the institutions, strongly affecting governance, mainly the provision of main services. The last crisis that began in 2008 contributed to populist political parties gaining strength and popular support.
The global crisis, which was especially primed by SUMER, as it did not have the aid that the countries of the European Union did have, brought the country to the brink of collapse.
Consequently, in the 2012 elections, the Sumer Popular Front (SPF) party won an absolute majority. This party, hereditary of the old regime and contrary to the accession to the European Union, returned to the old policies and moved away from the western countries to return to the Marxist orbit.
Until the beginning of the 21st Century, its Armed Forces were considered obsolete and were composed, for the most part, of material purchased from the former Soviet Union. But with the acquisitions of modern equipment during the democratic era, the quality and training of its Armed Forces have taken an important qualitative and quantitative leap.
AKAD (AKD) is a country not aligned with a Leninist government. AKAD was, during the communist era, one of SUMER’s main allies. In 1989 important diamond deposits were discovered in the Savage Islands. These small islands had a special status within the former Spanish colonies in North Africa, however, after the delivery of the former Spanish colonies, AKD declared the Savage Islands within its sovereignty. The dispute between Spain and AKD was in a latent state of calm since in 1982 UN resolution 4302/82 established the Wild Islands as an uninhabitable area of exclusive scientific use shared between Spain and Akad. This status quo was broken with the discovery of the diamond deposits. In its struggle to achieve international recognition of the sovereignty of the Savage Islands, AKAD had the communist regime of SUMER as its main ally, which is why, after the arrival of a Liberal Government in 1982, AKAD lost its main ally, which is why that encouraged, from the shadows, the SPF party.
Its Armed Forces are numerous and well equipped. Its main supplier is China. Although it has modern weapons, its main handicap is the lack of units that allow a strategic medium-long range projection.

 

b. Crisis development.
(1) Opposing Actors.
• SUMER (SUM): AKAD’s support for the SPF (Sumer Popular Front) party led them to win an absolute majority in the 2012 elections. After WWII and, after SUMER’s support for the Axis. The island of Menorca, which was part of Sumer, passed into Spanish hands. Since then, the various totalitarian governments of Sumer have tried to regain sovereignty over that island. During Sumer’s democratic era, the country put aside its claims. But with the return of the SPF party, Sumer has once again put pressure on Spain to regain control of the island. The SPF party encouraged the Sumerian population of Menorca, which represents 85% of the island’s total, to hold a referendum to determine if the wanted to return to the orbit of Sumer. The referendum, held unilaterally in 2016 and not recognized by the government of Spain, was wielded by Sumer to pressure the UN to force Spain to return the island. AKAD participated in this illegal referendum as international observer. No member of the European Union recognized the result of it. In 2017, the Menorca Libre political party managed to seize power on the island. Since then it has promoted strikes and demonstrations against the Spanish Government. In 2019, during the development of SUMER military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, a Sumerian patrol boat approached the waters of Menorca and a small detachment of Sumerian soldiers landed on the uninhabited islet of Isla del Aire and raised the Sumerian flag at the lighthouse of the island. This fact caused the greatest crisis between Spain and Sumer since WWII. Spain organized a military operation to expel the Sumerian military from the island. The crisis was resolved without going to major. However, the demonstrations for the actions of Spanish Armed Forces escalated in Menorca accompanied by violent clashes between protesters and forces of order. SUMER accused Spain of exceeding its use of force to break up the demonstrations. He formally accused Spain in the UN of using weapons of war against protesters.

AKAD paramilitary groups are believed to have organized the protesters. In 2020 SUMER warned Spain that it would come to defend the Sumerian population residing in Menorca if the repression continued. In October 2020, the president of SUMER warned, in the UN Security Council, that he would invade Menorca if a resolution in his favor did not succeed.
• AKAD (AKD): AKAD took advantage of the diplomatic crisis between Spain and SUMER to claim their rights over the Savage Islands. In 2018 AKAD made the unilateral decision to delimit its territorial waters. The measure contemplated 12 NM of sovereignty plus 200 NM of ZEE (Exclusive Economic Zone). This statement was made after the discovery in 2017 of an area of seamounts about 10NM south of the Savage Islands with rich deposits of materials prized by the technology industry such as tellurium and cobalt. The Spanish State refuses to recognize the right of ZEE to AKAD, which caused a diplomatic crisis between both countries. In 2019 Spain detected the construction of several buildings and a heliport in the Savage Islands. Under UN resolution 4302/82, the international community urged AKAD to dismantle the facilities built in the Savage Islands and return to the previous status quo. However AKAD ignored these warnings. In 2020, a military communications tower was built and an antiaircraft battery was established on the island. In August 2020, an AKAD patrol boat expelled a Spanish-flagged ship that was operating in waters near the Savage Islands. The EU imposed heavy economic sanctions on AKAD for its attitude. But these sanctions did not prevent the AKAD navy from expelling another Spanish ship in October 2020, this time through the use of force, in which three Spanish sailors were injured.

 

2. MISSION.
The NAC has organized a joint action plan against SUMER and AKAD. The main objetive is to maintain the security of the area and contain the forces of both countries while the High Commission for the United Nations and the European Union carry out negotiations at the political level to try to resolve the crisis through diplomatic channels.

 

a) Concept of Operations.
Deploy a force in the JOA enough to demonstrate to SUMER and AKAD the determination of NATO to resolve the crisis.
PHASE 1A: Maintain the Air and Maritime Police while carrying out the deployment of means and the creation of the necessary infrastructures and the communications to carry out the HOT OVEN operation. This phase has been assigned to the NRF SPA-JFAC deployed at the Torrejon AB.
Establishment of ACOs / ACMs necessary for the safe deployment of aerial means in the TOO. The JFACC will establish air superiority in AKAD to support the deployment of terrestrial media. The TG (Maritime Task-Group) will deploy in the JOA with the mission of protecting merchant maritime traffic and detecting possible support convoys from RAI.
PHASE 1B: In this phase the TF (Land Task Force) will be deployed to protect the HVT (High Value Targets) and HVI (High Value Individuals) in the Balearic archipielago. Continuous air demonstration of force will be maintained. Establishment of a NFZ (No Flight Zone) on over Menorca territory.
PHASE 2: In the event that political negotiations fail or attacks against allied forces occur, decisive military operations will be carried out to secure the region and neutralize the threats in the Mediterranean and/or Atlantic regions. In this phase, Land TFs will carry out missions against HVT / HVI within SUMER/AKAD. The Maritime TG will block and control the ports of SUMER/AKAD and support the Land TFs in its operations. The air component will maintain air superiority within the JOA and support Land TFs and Maritime TG.
COM SPA NRF-JFAC Will deploy a tailored Air Force to the Mediterranean and/or Atlantic regions to: provide Air Defence (AD) including TBMD; gain and maintain Air Superiority in the JOA; support the MCC in the establishment of FON in the Mediterranean and/or Atlantic regions.

 

 

¿Es creible la historia que me he inventado?? ya os pondré los medios aéreos que voy a darles.

 

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Veo que genera expectación  jeje... tener en cuenta que esto está pensado como ejercicio simulado y, aunque se intenta ajustarlo lo máximo posible para hacerlo realista, los medios son suficientes para evaluar a un centro de control en tres escenarios: paz, contra-sorpresa y contra-agresión. A ver que os parecen los medios disponibles:

 

COUNTRY

CALLSING

TYPE

BASE

ROLE

SPA

HALCON35

F18A

2

GCLP

AD/ADX

SPA

HALCON37

F18A

2

GCLP

AD/ADX

SPA

HALCON50

F18A

2

GCLP

AD/ADX

SPA

HALCON52

F18A

2

GCLP

AD/ADX

SPA

POKER10

F18M

2

LETO

AD/ADX

SPA

POKER12

F18M

2

LETO

AD/ADX

SPA

EBRO22

F18M

2

LEZG

AD/ADX

SPA

EBRO24

F18M

2

LEZG

AD/ADX

SPA

CHICO01

EF2000

2

LEAB

OCA

SPA

CHICO03

EF2000

2

LEAB

OCA

SPA

CHICO05

EF2000

2

LESJ

AD/ADX

SPA

CHICO07

EF2000

2

LESJ

AD/ADX

SPA

CHICO10

EF2000

2

LESJ

AD/ADX

SPA

COBRA

AV8

6

LHD

SEAD

SPA

GALLO60

EF2000

2

LEMO

OCA

SPA

GALLO62

EF2000

2

LEMO

OCA

SPA

GALLO70

EF2000

2

GCRR

AD/ADX

SPA

GALLO72

EF2000

2

GCRR

AD/ADX

SPA

GALLO74

EF2000

2

GCRR

AD/ADX

SPA

REPSOL

A400M

3

LEZG

AAR/TP

SPA

REPSOL

A400M

2

GCLP

AAR/TP

SPA

CISNE

P3C

2

LEMO

MPA

SPA

CISNE

P3C

1

GCRR

MPA

SPA

GUDINI

MQ9

2

GCRR

ISR

SPA

GUDINI

MQ9

2

LELC

ISR

SPA

COTOS

HD21

2

GCLP

SAR

SPA

 

HD21

2

LELC

SAR

SPA

 

HD21

2

LESJ

SAR

SPA

BRUJO

FA50

2

LETO

EW

SPA

BRUJO

FA50

2

GCRR

EW

ITA

ROMA24

AMX

2

LEAB

CAS

ITA

ROMA26

AMX

2

LEAB

CAS

ITA

ROMA35

AMX

2

GCRR

CAS

ITA

ROMA37

AMX

2

GCRR

CAS

ITA

PIZZA06

P72A

1

GCRR

MPA

FRA

PARIS30

M2000D

2

LESJ

AD/ADX

FRA

PARIS32

M2000D

2

LESJ

AD/ADX

FRA

BANDE66

EC725

2

LESJ

SAR

FRA

FIGARO15

EC725

2

GCRR

SOP

FRA

EIFEL40

RAFALE

2

LELC

CAS

FRA

EIFEL42

RAFALE

2

LELC

CAS

FRA

EIFEL44

RAFALE

2

GCLP

CAS

FRA

EIFEL46

RAFALE

2

GCLP

CAS

FRA

ROXANNE22

E3F

1

GCLP

AEW

USA

BRONCO44

F16

2

LELC

AD/OCA

USA

BRONCO46

F16

2

LELC

AD/OCA

USA

BRONCO52

F16

2

GCRR

AD/OCA

USA

BRONCO54

F16

2

GCRR

AD/OCA

USA

BRAVE20

P8A

1

LESJ

MPA

USA

QUID50

KC135R

1

LESJ

AAR

USA

QUID51

KC135R

1

GCRR

AAR

GER

BERLIN70

TORNADO

2

GCLP

SEAD

GER

BERLIN72

TORNADO

2

GCLP

SEAD

TUR

TAMARIZ

IAI

2

LELC

ISR

NAT

MAGIC

E3A

2

LELC

AEW

NAT

MAGIC

E3A

1

GCLP

AEW

 

@Trazadorsi alguna vez aprendo a diseñar campañas en un futuro muyyy lejano ya organizaría algo.

 

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Bueno... después de mucho consultar, las ROEs que he creado para el ejercicio son "NATO UNCLASIFFIED RELASEABLE TO HOT OVEN". Aun así hay mucha reticencia, por lo que he quitado, como podréis ver por la numeración, muuuuchas ROEs. Tan solo la 101A he dejado el texto completo, las demás las he reducido a lo esencial para no aburriros jeje. Son unas ROEs ficticias ideadas para un fin concreto de evaluación de personal. 

 

GENTEXT/2/GENERAL/THE ROE CONTAINED IN THIS MESSAGE IS NON ESCALATORY IN NATURE/DURING THESE OPERATIONS FORCES WILL BE DEPLOYED TO SUPPORT SPA SECURITY AND REGIONAL STABILITY/COM ASAF HAS RETAINED ANY OFFENSIVE ROE/UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, ALL ROE ARE DELEGABLE TO THE LOWEST ECHELON (THE INDIVIDUAL)//

 

GENTEXT/3/APPLICATION/THESE COM ASAF ROE APPLY TO ASAF OPERATING IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS (TOO) AND/OR JOINT OPERATING AREA (JOA) AS DEFINED IN REF C AND SHALL BE EXECUTED IAW REFS A AND B//

 

GENTEXT/4/APPLICATION/THE FOLLOWING ROE WILL PERMIT ASAF TO OPERATE AND USE FORCE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES SPECIFIED AND ARE CONSIDERED THE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION//

 

GENTEXT/5/USE OF FORCE/IN EVERY CASE, THE USE OF FORCE IS GOVERNED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF MINIMUM FORCE, PROPORTIONALITY, AND NECESSITY/ALL PERSONNEL ARE REMINDED OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO USE ONLY THE FORCE NECESSARY FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT/IAW REF A MINIMUM FORCE INCLUDES BY DEFINITION THE AUTHORITY TO USE DEADLY FORCE/DEADLY FORCE IS NOT THE DEFAULT LEVEL OF FORCE TO BE USED//

 

GENTEXT/6/SELF-DEFENCE/ NOTHING IN THESE ROE SHALL LIMIT COMMANDERS` OR INDIVIDUALS` INHERENT RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW/THE AUTHORISED ROE ARE TO BE EXECUTED IAW THE GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION SET OUT IN REF A//

 

GENTEXT/7/PERSONS OR PROPERTIES WITH DESIGNATED SPECIAL STATUS/COM ASAF IS AUTHORISED TO DESIGNATE PERSONS DESIGNATED WITH SPECIAL STATUS (PDSS) AND PROPERTY DESIGNATED WITH SPECIAL STATUS (PRDSS)/THIS AUTHORITY MAY NOT BE DELEGATED//

 

GENTEXT/8/INTERNATIONAL BORDERS/INTERNATIONAL BORDERS MAY NOT BE CROSSED WITHOUT PRIOR DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE OR SPECIFIC ALLIANCE APPROVAL//

 

GENTEXT/9/THE USE OF FORCE FOLLOWING COMMENCEMENT OF ARMED CONFLICT/ FOLLOWING COMMENCEMENT OF ARMED CONFLICT, WHICH MAY INCLUDE DECLARATIONS OF COUNTER-SURPRISE OR COUNTER-AGGRESSION, INVOLVING ASAF AS COMBATANTS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT APPLIES/THE NAC/DPC AND NATO COMMANDERS WILL CONTINUE TO USE THE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO AUTHORISE AND IMPLEMENT REQUIRED ROE AFTER A COMMENCEMENT OF ARMED CONFLICT/IN SUCH CASES, ROE GENERALLY LIMIT OR RESTRICT THE OTHERWISE LAWFUL USE OF FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT//

 

GENTEXT/10/POLITICAL POLICY INDICATOR(PPI) YANKEE/MAINTAIN STATUS QUO/ POLITICAL/MILITARY STRATEGY IS TO USE ASAF TO MAINTAIN CURRENT REGIONAL BALANCE OR RETURN TO PREVIOUS STATUS QUO FOLLOWING DESTABILISATION/ SIGNIFICANT USE OF FORCE TO SUPPORT SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES MAY BE AUTHORISED UNDER PPI YANKEE//

 

GENTEXT/11/DETENTION/UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES ARE ASAF TO DETAIN ANY INDIVIDUAL OR SEIZE ANY PROPERTY WHERE THE DETENTION OF THAT PERSON OR THE SEIZURE OF THAT PROPERTY IS NOT NECESSARY FOR FORCE PROTECTION, SELF-DEFENCE, OR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT/PERSONS DETAINED WILL BE SEARCHED AND, IF NECESSARY, DISARMED/LEGAL AGREEMENTS WILL BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN ASAF AND A REGIONAL STATE IOT ENABLE TRANSFER OF CAPTURED PERSONS, EVIDENCE, AND MATERIAL FOR SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION//

 

GENTEXT/12/AIR POLICING ROE/AIR POLICING FOLLOWS INSTRUCTIONS IN REF B// THE FOLLOWING ROE ARE REQUESTED IOT ENABLE ASAF TO CONDUCT THEIR MISSIONS GIVEN NAC ID IN FORCE//

 

ROE/101A// GENTEXT/ROETEXT/ROE ONE ZERO ONE ALPHA (101A)/ENTRY INTO TERRITORY, AIRSPACE AND TERRITORIAL WATERS OF ANY NATO NATION WITHIN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS (TOO) FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY (PR) AND/OR JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY (JPR) OPERATIONS IS AUTHORISED// GENTEXT/AMPN/1/RETAINED BY CC// GENTEXT/AMPN/2/ENTRY INTO NATO TERRITORIES FOR PR/JPR WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVALS IS PERMITTED// GENTEXT/AMPN/3/ JPR/PR IS THE SUM OF MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC AND CIVIL EFFORTS TO EFFECT THE RECOVERY AND REINTEGRATION OF ISOLATED PERSONNEL (ISOP), AND IT COVERS THE FOUR MILITARY PR MISSION AREAS WHICH ARE SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR)// GENTEXT/JUSTIFICATION/REQUIRED FOR RESCUE OF ASAF PERSONNEL SUCH AS AIRCREW AND VESSELS IN DISTRESS// GENTEXT/RISK IF NOT APPROVED/ASAF UNABLE TO RESPOND RAPIDLY TO ASAF IN DISTRESS//

 

ROE/101B//ENTRY INTO TERRITORY, AIRSPACE AND TERRITORIAL WATERS OF ANY NON NATO NATION WITHIN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS (TOO) FOR PERSONNEL RECOVERY (PR) AND/OR JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY (JPR) OPERATIONS IS AUTHORISED/ENTRY INTO NON NATO TERRITORIES FOR PR/JPR WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVALS IS PERMITTED

ROE/102A// ENTRY INTO THOSE PORTIONS OF THE TERRITORY, AIRSPACE AND TERRITORIAL WATERS OF ANY NATO NATION THAT FALLS WITHIN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS (TOO) FOR MISSION RELATED DUTIES IS AUTHORISED

ROE/102D// ENTRY INTO THE TERRITORY, AIRSPACE, AND TERRITORIAL WATERS OF SUMER AND AKAD, FOR SOF MISSION RELATED DUTIES IS AUTHORISED

ROE/111// UNRESTRICTED POSITIONING OF ASAF RELATIVE TO ANY FORCES, VESSELS, AIRCRAFT, VEHICLES, OR PERSONS FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT IS AUTHORISED

ROE/131//PHYSICAL OBSTRUCTION TO PREVENT BOARDING, DETENTION, OR SEIZURE OF ASAF MILITARY/MERCHANT VESSELS, AIRCRAFT, VEHICLES, OR PROPERTY WITH DESIGNATED SPECIAL STATUS (PRDSS) INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC, AIRCRAFT, AND/OR VEHICLES IS AUTHORISED

ROE/132//USE OF MINIMUM FORCE TO PREVENT BOARDING, DETENTION OR SEIZURE OF ASAF OR CIVILIAN VESSELS, AIRCRAFT, VEHICLES, PROPERTIES, OR PROPERTY WITH DESIGNATED SPECIAL STATUS (PRDSS) INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC, AIRCRAFT AND/OR VEHICLES IS AUTHORISED

ROE/151// PASSING OF WARNINGS TO ANY PERSONS, AIRCRAFT, VEHICLES OR VESSELS BY ALL MEANS UP TO AND INCLUDING WARNING SHOTS FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT AND FORCE PROTECTION IS AUTHORISED

ROE/161// ORDERING OF STOPPING AND/OR DIVERSION(S) TO ANY VESSELS, AIRCRAFT, VEHICLES OR PERSONS IN JOA FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT OR FORCE PROTECTION IS AUTHORISED

ROE/162// USE OF MINIMUM FORCE TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH THE ORDERING OF STOPPING AND/OR DIVERSION(S) TO ANY VESSELS, AIRCRAFT, VEHICLES OR PERSONS FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT OR FORCE PROTECTION IS AUTHORISED/ SUFFICIENT WARNINGS TO MINIMISE AND PREVENT RISK TO PERSONNEL SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIOR TO THE USE OF FORCE/ THIS ROE SHALL BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ROE 161

ROE/187// USE OF MINIMUM FORCE TO SEIZE AND/OR SECURE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NEUROLOGICAL (CBRN) WEAPONS AND/OR STOCKS IS AUTHORISED

ROE/221//ILLUMINATION OF ANY FORCES, VESSELS, AIRCRAFT, VEHICLES, PROPERTY, OR PERSONNEL BY ANY MEANS FOR INTERCEPTION, IDENTIFICATION, FORCE PROTECTION OR TO ATTRACT ATTENTION IF NON RESPONSIVE TO HAILINGS IS AUTHORISED/ THIS ROE MUST BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ROE 281

ROE/231//POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION IS TO BE ESTABLISHED VISUALLY OR BY AT LEAST TWO OF THE FOLLOWING MEANS: IFF (OR OTHER SYSTEMS REQUIRING A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE UNIDENTIFIED UNIT), ELECTRO-OPTIC, ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT MEASURE, TRACK BEHAVIOUR, FLIGHT PLAN CORRELATION, THERMAL IMAGING OR ACOUSTIC INTELLIGENCE. POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION IS TO BE ESTABLISHED PRIOR TO ANY ENGAGEMENT/THIS ROE MUST BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ROE 232// GENTEXT/AMPN/3/IDENTIFICATION BY UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS (UAS) IS CONSIDERED VISUAL IDENTIFICATION

ROE/241// EXERCISING WITHIN THE TERRITORY, AIRSPACE AND TERRITORIAL WATERS OF NATO NATIONS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND AIRSPACE, WITHIN THE JOA, IN THE PRESENCE OF OPPOSING UNITS IS AUTHORISED

ROE/281// DESIGNATION OF TARGETS BY PASSIVE AND ACTIVE SYSTEMS IS AUTHORISED

ROE/282//THE USE OF FIRE CONTROL RADAR SYSTEMS FOR HEIGHT FINDING PURPOSES IS AUTHORISED

ROE/331// USE OF MINIMUM FORCE TO PREVENT INTERFERENCE WITH ASAF DURING THE CONDUCT OF THEIR MISSIONS IS AUTHORISED

ROE/362// CONTROL AND/OR NEUTRALISATION OF CIVILIAN INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION MECHANISMS WITH THE INTENT OF UTILIZING ITS ABILITIES TO INFLUENCE AND PERSUADE NAC-APPROVED AUDIENCES IS AUTHORISED

ROE/363// COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENCE (CND) AGAINST COMPUTERS OR COMPUTER SYSTEMS THAT HAVE INTRUDED INTO AND DAMAGED ASAF COMPUTERS OR COMPUTER NETWORKS, INCLUDING ACTIONS THAT MAY RESULT IN INTRUSION INTO ANY INTERMEDIARY SYSTEMS OR NETWORKS AND CAUSED DAMAGE TO ANY COMPUTER SYSTEMS OR NETWORKS ARE AUTHORISED

ROE/364// COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENCE (CND) AGAINST COMPUTERS OR COMPUTER SYSTEMS THAT HAVE INTRUDED INTO ASAF COMPUTERS OR COMPUTER NETWORKS, ARE AUTHORISED

ROE/367// MILITARY INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES BY ANY MEANS (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA) TOWARDS NAC APPROVED AUDIENCES IS AUTHORISED

ROE/368// PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES BY ANY MEANS (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA) TOWARDS NAC APPROVED TARGET AUDIENCES IS AUTHORISED

ROE/371// USE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES AGAINST OPPOSING UNDERWATER SENSORS & COMMUNICATIONS/NON-SATELLITE VHF OR UHF COMMUNICATIONS/SEARCH & ACQUISITION RADARS/MISSILE & FIRE CONTROL RADARS IS AUTHORISED

ROE/372//THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES (ECM) AGAINST OPPOSING INTEGRATED AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS, COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA-LINKS IS AUTHORISED WHEN NATO AIRCRAFT ARE OPERATING INSIDE KNOWN OR SUSPECTED SAM MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONES

ROE/374// UNRESTRICTED USE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES (ECM) IS AUTHORISED

ROE/376// THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES (ECM) AGAINST OPPOSING SAM TARGET TRACKERS, MISSILE GUIDANCE OR ACQUISITION EMITTERS IS AUTHORISED

ROE/377// USE OF ECM AGAINST RADIO COMMAND IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (RCIED) SYSTEMS IS AUTHORISED

ROE/380// LAYING OF ANTI PERSONNEL MINES IS PROHIBITED

ROE/423// ATTACK AGAINST FORCES DEMONSTRATING HOSTILE INTENT (NOT CONSTITUTING AN IMMINENT ATTACK) AGAINST FRIENDLY FORCES AND/OR PDSS/PRDSS IS AUTHORISED

ROE/424// ATTACK AGAINST FORCES WHICH COMMIT OR DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTE TO A HOSTILE ACT (NOT CONSTITUTING AN ACTUAL ATTACK) AGAINST FRIENDLY FORCES AND/OR PDSS/PRDSS IS AUTHORISED

ROE/425// ATTACK AGAINST OPPOSING FORCES, WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED, OR DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTED TO AN ATTACK IS AUTHORISED

ROE/426// ASAF COMMANDERS ARE AUTHORISED TO JUDGE WHETHER A OPPOSING FORCES ATTACK AGAINST OWN UNITS IS THE FIRST OF A SERIES AND, IN THIS EVENT, TO ATTACK ALL OPPOSING UNITS CONSTITUTING A CONTINUING THREAT

ROE/427//)/ATTACK ON ANY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AND UNITS, WHICH ARE ENGAGED IN OR MAKE AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO MILITARY ACTIVITY THAT THREATENS ASAF IS AUTHORISED

ROE/429// ATTACK ON OPPOSING FORCES AND FACILITIES WHICH ARE OPPOSING ASAF OR ARE DESIGNATED AS MILITARY TARGETS IS AUTHORISED

 

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